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mental condition is in controversy and that good cause exists for each
examination. Effectively, then, the Court struck a balance between
protection of the parties involved and allowance of medical exami-
nations.
The adoption of the position taken by the court of appealsa8 would
have ignored this delicate balance by allowing physical and mental
examinations merely by the inclusion within the pleadings of state-
ments calculated to have that effect. Further, under this view, court-
ordered medical examinations could easily have become a matter of
routine, resulting in harassment and costly delay at the expense of
the hapless litigant.
Fortunately the Court found the balance and struck it.
A. W. Tarkington, Jr.
Settlement With One Joint Tortfeasor Bars Recovery
Against Others of the Settling Tortfeasor's
Proportionate Share of Damages
I. INTRODUCTION
The terms "joint torts" and "joint tortfeasors" have been the
subject of much confusion.! Numerous attempts have been made
to define the terms and a multitude of tests have been proposed in
an effort to determine when the principles embodied in these terms
are applicable.' It is the friction created by the unavoidable clash
of two of these principles, viz., the doctrine of contribution between
joint tortfeasors and the rule that a plaintiff may settle with one
or more joint tortfeasors without surrendering his cause of action
against the others, which gives cause for concern.
A. Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors
The common law doctrine of contribution between joint tort-
" That is, that the mere allegation within the pleadings that his poor vision was a con-
tributing factor to the collision was enough to satisfy the requirements of rule 35(a) for
ordering medical examinations. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963).
1 See, e.g., Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 399 (1939),
and Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937).
'A few of the tests proposed have been: the existence of a like, or common duty; the
opportunity to use the same evidence against each defendant; and the identity of a cause of
action against each defendant. See generally, I COOLEY, ToRTs 276-78 (4th ed. 1932).
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feasors? has developed along very unusual lines.' Since 1799, it has
been an established common law principle that no right of contribu-
tion exists between joint tortfeasors' This rule, although apparently
originally intended to apply only to intentional wrongdoers, has
been applied also to negligent tortfeasors. In fact, a majority of
American jurisdictions in which contribution rights are not yet con-
trolled by statute apply the doctrine regardless of the presence or
absence of intent on the part of the persons causing the injury.'
The underlying theory supporting these holdings is that a man
should not be allowed to make his own misconduct the basis for a
cause of action in his favor. A growing number of these jurisdic-
tions, however, have done away with the common law prohibition
as it applies to negligent tortfeasors and have in effect established a
common law right as between these joint tortfeasors. The destruction
'The doctrine of contribution has as its sole function the allocation or equalization,
among the parties who are at fault, of the burden resulting from tortious conduct.
4 See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552
(1936); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REV. 150
(1947); James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 1156 (1941); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasars, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 130 (1932).
'Merryweather v. Nixon, 1 Camp. 345, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). In this case,
plaintiff had been forced to pay under a joint judgment rendered against the defendant
and himself. From the meager record available, it appears that the two were intentional
tortfeasors acting in concert.
' Almost one-half of the states will adhere to the common law rule and do not allow
contribution between tortfeasors. The states which continue to follow the common law rule
are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming. Of these states, fifteen apply the
doctrine equally as to negligent or intentional tortfeasors. Alabama: Gobble v, Bradford,
226 Ala. 517, 147 So. 619 (1933). Arizona: Schade Transfer & Storage Co. v. Alabama
Freight Lines, 75 Ariz. 201, 254 P.2d 800 (1953) (dictum). Colorado: Colorado & S. Ry.
Co. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 P. 30 (1913). Connecticut: Rose v.
Heisler, 118 Conn. 632, 174 A. 66 (1934). Florida: Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper,
142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940). Illinois: John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing
Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923) (dictum). Indiana: Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind.
141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937). Nebraska: Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F.Supp. 150
(D.C. Neb. 1950) (dictum). New Hampshire: Graveline v. D. F. Sullivan Auto Co., 81
N.H. 279, 124 A. 552 (1924). Ohio: Royal Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582,
173 N.E. 194 (1930), overruling Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663
(1853). Oklahoma: Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 P. 641 (1928).
Oregon: Smith v. Burns, 71 Ore. 133, 135 P. 200 (1914). Utah: Hardman v. Matthews,
1 Utah 2d 110, 262 P.2d 748 (1953). Vermont: Spalding v. Oakes' Admr., 42 Vt. 343
(1869). Washington: City of Puyallup v. Vergowe, 95 Wash. 320, 163 P. 779 (1917).
' California: Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal.2d 270, 363 P.2d 873 (1961). Iowa: Best v. Yerk-
es, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956). Maine: Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815
(1918). Minnesota: Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887). Tennessee:
Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950). (Tennessee courts have
limited the right of contribution to the passively negligent tortfeasor as against the actively
negligent tortfeasor.) Wisconsin: Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167
N.W. 1048 (1918). District of Columbia: George's Radio Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126
F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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of the "no contribution" rule has been justified primarily on the
grounds that the rule has not been a deterrent to tortious conduct
and has served to stifle attempts to compromise and settle contro-
versies prior to litigation."
The common law rule has been abolished in several states by the
passage of legislation which provides for contribution between joint
tortfeasors.' Texas was among the pioneers in this area of tort law,
imposing a ditty to make contribution through passage of the Con-
tribution Between Tortfeasors Act of 1917.10 The purpose of the
Texas statute is to allocate the burden equally between all solvent
tortfeasors" by providing that a tortfeasor can recover from his
solvent joint tortfeasors that amount which he is required to pay
in excess of his pro rata share of the judgment."2
'McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital
Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"The remaining states have dealt with the problem through legislation. Arkansas:
ARK. STAT. ANN., § 34-1001 (1947). Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-08
(1953). Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (1956). Hawaii: HAWAII REV. LAWS, §§
246-10 to -16 (1955). Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412.030 (1955). Louisiana:
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 1111-16 (1961). Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1962). Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957).
Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962). Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 335.5
(1960). Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1959). New Jersey: N.J. REV. STAT. S
2A:53A-2 (1951). New Mexcio: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1953). New York:
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 211-a (1962). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1959).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960). Pennsylvania: PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (1961). Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -11
(1956). South Dakota: S. D. CODE §§ 33.04A01-.04A10 (Supp. 1960). Texas: TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1948). Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1961). West Virgi-
nia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5482[131 (Supp. 1962).
'ITEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1948).
"Contribution between tortfeasors.
Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered
in any suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort, except in causes
wherein the right of contribution or of indemnity, or of recovery, over, by and
between the defendants is given by statute or exists under the common law,
shall, upon payment of said judgment, have a right of action against his co-
defendant or co-defendants and may recover from each a sum equal to the
proportion of all of the defendants named in said judgment rendered to the
whole amount of said judgment. If any of said persons codefendant be in-
solvent, then recovery may be had in proportion as such defendant or de-
fendants are not insolvent; and the right of recovery over against such in-
solvent defendant or defendants in judgment shall exist in favor of each de-
fendant in judgment in proportion as he has been caused to pay by reason of
such insolvency. Acts 1917, p. 360."
" Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
error ref., in particular the statement on page 587 where Chief Justice Grissom
says "our courts have held that the purpose of the statute was to place the
burden equally upon joint tortfeasors; that it was enacted to prevent inequities
between joint tortfeasors; that a defendant tort-feasor may bring in other
wrong-doers not sued by the plaintiff; that a joint judgment against tort-
feasors is not required as a prerequisite to recovery of contribution by one
against another and that the "dominant purpose" of article 2212 is to "create
the right of contribution."
"The statute has remained unchanged since its original passage. See Hodges, Contribution
B. Release Or Covenant Not To Sue
The common law rule regarding the giving of a release or covenant
not to sue one of several joint tortfeasors appears to have developed
along the same harsh lines as the common law doctrine of contribu-
tion. The original rule was that the release of one joint tortfeasor
released all, even if there was an express reservation of a cause of
action against the tortfeasors who were not parties to the release.'"
In other words, the liability of the tortfeasors was joint, and not
several. The rule apparently was based on the theory that the in-
jured party had only one claim. By accepting satisfaction for his
injury from one joint tortfeasor the injured party in effect discharged
his entire claim so that he no longer had any cause of action against
the remaining tortfeasors. The harshness of such a rule is apparent
on its face and dissatisfaction with it has resulted in legislation'
and court-made devices'5 designed to avoid its effect. The most im-
portant device adopted by the courts is embodied in the rule that a
covenant not to sue as opposed to a release of one of several tort-
feasors does not operate to release the others.'" The theory behind
this rule is that a covenant not to sue is not a present abandonment
or relinquishment of a right or claim but is merely an agreement
not to enforce an existing cause of action.' However, the effect of
either a release or covenant not to sue upon the released party is
precisely the same.
II. EFFECT OF COVENANT NOT TO SUE UPON PARTIES TO SUIT
The legal effect of a covenant not to sue differs according to the
approach taken by each jurisdiction. The alternative approaches are
either to (1) deprive the settlement of its necessary finality, (2) de-
prive the non-settling tortfeasor of his right to contribution, or
(3) deny the injured party his full satisfaction by placing upon him
a burden which would otherwise be the responsibility of one or all
and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150 (1947) for a perceptive analysis
of the statute, its application and effect.
'3 See generally, 45 Am. JuR. 701, Release § 37 (1943); and 76 C.J.S. 678, Release S
49 (1952).
14In particular see, Uniform Joint Obligations Act of 1925, §§ 4-5, 9B UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED 229, 230-34 (1957); and Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
of 1939, §§ 4-5, 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 233, 242-46 (1957).
"5 The two primary escape devices, other than the covenant not to sue, have been
created by excepting from the general rule a release of one who is not, in fact, liable for
the tort, and a tort committed by independent or concurring, as distinguished from joint,
tortfeasors.
"0 Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, 186 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
error ref. w.m.
"Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
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of the defendants. The basic conflict requires a policy decision to
determine the best method available for encouraging parties to
settle their differencs without litigation.
A. Deprive The Settlement Of Its Necessary Finality
The settlement may be deprived of its finality by allowing the
injured party to obtain a judgment for his total damages less the
consideration received in settlement, and then allowing the joint
tortfeasor who pays more than his pro rata share to have a cause
of action for contribution against the settling tortfeasor. This is the
solution found in states which adopted the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939,"8 before its amendment in 1955.
It provided in section 4 that "release by the injured person of one
joint tortfeasor . . . reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors
in the amount of the consideration paid for the release. . . ." Further-
more, section 5 of the act provided that "[a] release . . . does not
relieve him [the joint tortfeasor] from liability to make contribution
to another joint tortfeasor. . . ." The legal principle upon which
this result is based is that an injured plaintiff is entitled to full and
complete satisfaction for his injuries from any or all of the joint
tortfeasors whose liability to the plaintiff is joint and several. Also,
allowing an action for contribution recognizes the duty and the right
of joint tortfeasors to equalize their obligation.
This solution seems to offset any disadvantages which might accrue
to a non-settling tortfeasor on account of a settlement to which he
was not a party and to which he did not consent. Indeed, the cove-
nant not to sue could operate to the benefit of the remaining joint
tortfeasors because it would assure them of a credit against any sub-
sequent judgment. Nevertheless, this alternative discourages com-
promise and settlement in that a defendant continues to be subject
to a suit for contribution. Moreover, the use of a covenant not to sue
could tempt plaintiffs to make collusive settlements, the situation
which has motivated the enactment of most contribution statutes.
B. Deprive The Other Tortfeasor Of His Right To Contribution
The second solution is to deprive the non-settling tortfeasor of his
right to contribution by requiring him to pay the entire judgment
subject only to a credit in the amount of the consideration paid for
the covenant not to sue. This alternative is the present solution pro-
" 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 233 (1957). See also PROSSER, TORTS, § 46 at 272
(3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 885 (1939); and 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 5
10.2 at 714 (1956).
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vided by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of
1939, as amended in 1955.1" Sections 4 and 5 of the original act
have been replaced by a new section 4 which provides that a release
"(a) ...reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount
of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and, (b)
• . .discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tortfeasor."' Under this solution, the
remaining tortfeasor would be deprived of his right to equalize his
payment with that of the settling tortfeasor. The result could be
justified as a penalty against the non-settling tortfeasor for his
failure to compromise and for causing the additional expense and
delay involved in litigation. Undoubtedly, this would encourage
settlements and discourage litigation.
The primary objection to summarily depriving the non-settling
tortfeasor of his contribution right is that he should not be adversely
affected by a settlement to which he was not a party. Moreover, as
with the first, this alternative does not deter the injured party from
making a collusive settlement. The solution of denial of contribution
however, unlike the others, is precluded in Texas because it directly
conflicts with our statute providing for contribution among joint
tortfeasors.5'
C. Deny The Injured Party His Full Compensation
The third solution is to deny the plaintiff full compensation for
his injuries by reducing the amount of the verdict rendered against
all tortfeasors by the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of the
damages. This solution places the burden, which otherwise would fall
upon one or more of the defendants, upon the injured party. More
importantly, it serves to decrease the injured party's total recovery
as the direct result of the injured party accepting less than a pro
rata share of recoverable damages from the compromising tortfeasor.
Under this alternative, compromise agreements become final and the
settling tortfeasor is protected from future suits for contribution.
At the same time, the injured party is not tempted to enter into a
collusive settlement as he might be under the other alternatives be-
59 Uniform Contribution Among Tortjeasors Act of 1939, as amended in 1955, 9 UNZ-
FORM LAWS ANNOTATED 111, 118-19 (Supp. 1963).
20 Only Massachusetts and North Dakota have adopted the 1955 revision. See Massachu-
setts: MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN., ch. 214 §§ 1-4 (1962). North Dakota: N. D. CENT. CODE
32-38-01 to -04 (1957).
21 See note 10 supra.
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cause any settlement agreed upon will cause a pro rata reduction in
the amount of his recovery.
While the question has not been broached in most jurisdictions,"2
the alternative of reduced damages has found support in the juris-
dictions which have encountered it.' In fact, both New Jersey" and
the District of Columbia" have applied the proportionate share re-
duction of damages rule in joint tort situations, primarily for the
reasons indicated. In the leading New Jersey case, " Mr. Justice Bren-
nan (then Judge Brennan of the Supreme Court of New Jersey)
reasoned that "if the injured party is required to credit only the
amount received in settlement . . . he may be tempted to make
collusive settlements . . . .Also the settlement then lacks finality
because the settler cannot count on his adjustment with the injured
person as ending the matter but must apprehend a suit at the hands
of his co-tortfeasors. This would have a stifling effect upon efforts
at compromise and settlement, contrary to the policy of our law
.... Similar reasoning is found in the leading District of Columbia
decision" and in an earlier Texas case."
Obviously these three alternatives can not be used in conjunction;
one must be used to the exclusion of the others. A determination
of which alternative is to be applied necessitates balancing the in-
terests involved. The apparent merit of each alternative has led the
Supreme Court of Texas to reevaluate these policy considerations.
III. PALESTINE CONTRACTORS, INC. V. PERKINS'
Mrs. Perkins was a passenger in an automobile involved in a three-
way collision with a truck owned by Palestine Contractors, Inc.
and another automobile. Herman Conoway, the driver of the other
automobile, turned into an intersection in violation of a flashing
red signal. The streets were wet. The driver of the corporation's
truck was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and failed to stop
the vehicle. He lost control, crossed over onto the other side of the
22 See notes 6-9 supra.
23 See cases cited notes 24-25 inIra.
2 4 Pilosky v. Dougherty, 179 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (applying New Jersey
law); Smootz v. Ienni, 37 N.J. Super. 529, 117 A.2d 675 (1955); Oliver v. Russo, 29 N.J.
418, 149 A.2d 213 (1959); and Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110
A.2d 24 (1954).
22Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Otis v. Thomas, 262 F.2d
232 (D.C. Cir. 1958); and McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cit. 1943).
ZJudson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).2 7
1Id. at 78, 110 A.2d at 36.2
1Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cit. 1962).
29 Gattegno v. The Parisian, 53 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
30 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
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road, hit Mrs. Perkins' automobile and then crossed back hitting
Conoway's automobile.
Sometime after the accident Mrs. Perkins gave Conoway, who was
insolvent, a covenant not to sue, reciting a consideration of $10.00
which was never paid. In the covenant, Mrs. Perkins expressly re-
served her cause of action against the corporation. 1 Mrs. Perkins
then brought suit against Palestine Contractors, Inc., who in turn
filed a third party action against Conoway. Palestine alleged that
the covenant not to sue given to Conoway operated as a release of
her claim against him so that only one-half of the damages could
be recovered from Palestine. Its position was based on the theory
that Mrs. Perkins agreed not to sue Conoway, directly or indirectly,
and that by asserting full damages against Palestine she was indirectly
suing Conoway in contravention of their agreement because Palestine
would have a right of contribution from Conoway for one-half of
the damages if held liable for the full amount. Therefore, Palestine
argued, Mrs. Perkins should only recover one-half of her damages
from Palestine Contractors because in effect she had sold her right
to one-half of her claim by giving Conoway a covenant not to sue.
The trial court rendered judgment for Mrs. Perkins against both
parties and allowed Palestine Contractors, Inc. a judgment against
Conoway for contribution. The court of civil appeals affirmed the
judgment but reformed it to the extent that Palestine Contractors,
Inc. could have no right to contribution unless it paid more than
its pro rata share of the damages. 2 The Supreme Court of Texas
reversed and held that the covenant not to sue Conoway reduced
Mrs. Perkins' recovery by Conoway's proportionate share of the total
damages and therefore no contribution would be necessary."
In arriving at its decision, the court relied especially on three
cases: Gattegno v. The Parisian,34 Judson v. Peoples Bank 0 Trust
Co.,35 and Martello v. Hawley."6 In the Gattegno case, the injured
party released one of two alleged joint tortfeasors in exchange for
the privilege of breaking a lease. The Texas Commission of Appeals
held that this was in effect a release of one-half of the injured
party's right to damages, stating: "Therefore, if it be found that
Gattegno and Muir are both active tortfeasors as between each other,
31 Id. at 765.
32Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 375 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error
granted.3
3 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
34 53 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
"'17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
36 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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the release having discharged Muir as to all liability to The Parisian,
has at least discharged one-half its damages."' 7 In Palestine, the court
of civil appeals referred to the above statement as a dictum.'8 The
Supreme Court of Texas, however, decided that the Commission of
Appeals had intended that the statement should serve as a guide to
the lower court upon a retrial of the case;' and, that the instruction
was at least a "judicial dictum," deliberately made for the purpose
of being followed, and not simply "obiter dictum." The dissent
distinguished Gattegno" on the ground that, in Gattegno, Muir was
a solvent joint tortfeasor who could have been liable for contribu-
tion." Because of the solvency aspect the expressed intent of the
parties was effectuated in Gattegno, while in Palestine the court gave
the covenant not to sue an effect which was contrary to the expressed
intent of the parties. In addition, the dissent indicated that the re-
lease in Gattegno was the same as an indemnity on the part of the
Parisian in favor of Muir and that this construction of the instru-
ment involved was a distinguishing feature to be considered." This
argument, however, appears to be unsound because when one party
covenants not to sue directly or indirectly, an indemnity agreement
would seem unnecessary and would merely clarify the result which
should occur without one. The dissent also placed great importance
on the fact that Gattegno had not been cited as authority in any
case in which a plaintiff had executed such a covenant.' However,
as the majority indicated," it does not appear that a contention to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery had been made in the cited cases, and
without such a contention these decisions do not necessarily conflict
with the majority theory.
In the Judson case,4' decided under a contribution statute very
similar to the Texas statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a settlement with one tortfeasor proportionately reduced the
plaintiff's recovery. The court based its decision primarily on the
grounds that such a rule encourages complete settlements and deters
collusive settlements." The court there said that a collusive settle-
'7 53 S.W.2d 1005, 1008 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
38375 S.W.2d 751, 754 (1964).
'9386 S.W.2d 764, 773 (1964).
4Id. at 774.
41 Id. at 776.
2Ibid.
4Id. at 777.
4Id. at 766. Note particularly the cases cited by the majority in support of this con-
clusion.
"Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
"Id. at 78, 110 A.2d at 36.
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ment would be ineffective when the plaintiff was required to reduce
his recoverable damages by the settler's pro rata share as a result of
the settlement.47 In addition, the settlement is assured of its finality
and an additional suit for contribution is avoided. s Thus, needless
circuity of actions is avoided because the non-settling tortfeasor has
not been required to pay more than his pro rata share of the judg-
ment and is therefore not entitled to contribution.
In Martello," a District of Columbia case, the injured party had
settled with one of the joint tortfeasors. The court entered judg-
ment against the non-settling tortfeasor for one-half of the damages
determined by the jury and ruled that the settling tortfeasor was
not liable for contribution.5" The court said that any other decision
would be unfair to the settling tortfeasor who had attempted to
buy his peace, and to the non-settling tortfeasor who should not be
prejudiced by an agreement to which he was not a party and to which
he did not consent."
Admittedly, the court in Palestine does not decide contra to the
established common law rule that a plaintiff may sue one of several
joint tortfeasors and collect his full damages from the one he sues."
Rather, the court expressly reiterates the correctness of this funda-
mental rule. Nor does the majority repudiate the accepted doctrine
that had the plaintiff sued one of the joint tortfeasors without agree-
ing not to sue the other, the tortfeasor ultimately brought to judg-
ment would be required to pay the total damages. 3 The Palestine
rule allows finality of settlement combined with a minimum of in-
justice to the plaintiff who has the choice of whether to sue or re-
lease the defendant. The rule tends to decrease the inequities ob-
tained in the older doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rationale of the Palestine decision leans heavily on the fact
that the court must balance the interests of the parties involved, in
that there are no perfect solutions to the problem. The result, al-
though limited to a narrow context, is significant in two major
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
" Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
10 Id. at 724.
'1 Ibid.
"Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
53 See note 10 supra. Of course, the tortfeasor who paid more than his pro rata share of
damages could sue his joint tortfeasors for contribution either in the same or in a subsequent
suit, if there had been no release or covenant.
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respects. First, it is an acceptance of a solution which in effect
destroys the temptation on the part of the plaintiff to make a collu-
sive settlement. Obviously, a collusive settlement is wholly ineffective
when the required result is a credit of the settling tortfeasor's pro
rata share of the damages. Under the rule as adopted, if the settle-
ment is not collusive, then the plaintiff makes a settlement upon the
basis of his own appraisal of the risks incident to recovery. If an
appraisal has been made, the plaintiff would hardly be deterred from
making the settlement because it may later be found that he accepted
less than the settling tortfeasors' proportionate share. Moreover, the
amount of the judgment sought is not the plaintiff's sole considera-
tion in his decision to settle the controversy with one of the joint
tortfeasors."
Second, the decision encourages attempts at complete rather than
partial settlement. In any law suit, a defendant settles primarily in
order to save money and to avoid the litigation." If the non-settling
tortfeasor has a right of contribution against the settling tortfeasor,
these incentives would be destroyed. The settling tortfeasor could be
sued either in the same or in a subsequent action and would therefore
lose any advantages he may have bargained for and obtained in the
settlement. This problem is succinctly described in the Commissioner's
comments regarding the 1955 amendment to the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act of 19 39 ." There it is stated that the
effect of allowing contribution to the non-settling tortfeasor has
been "to discourage settlements in joint tort cases, by making it
impossible for one tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the
file . . . . No defendant wants to settle when he remains open to
contribution in an uncertain amount, to be determined on the basis
of a judgment against another . . . . " Thus, the result in Palestine
gives to the release or the covenant not to sue the necessary finality
which should be afforded such an instrument and encourages com-
plete settlements. As a consequence, the rule prefers the doctrine
of compromise and settlement over contribution but attempts to
maintain the essential integrity of each so far as is possible.
"'Before considering any settlement, a prudent plaintiff as a minimum should examine
his chances of recovery in the light of the difficulty involved in proving negligence; his
need for emergency funds; the financial position of the defendant; and the amount of
previous judgments determined under similar conditions.
s" See the discussions in James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic
Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1941); James, Replication, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1178
(1941); Gregory, Contribution Among joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REV.
1170 (1941); and Gregory, Rejoinder, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1184 (1941).
5s See note 19 supra.
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The decision is not a panacea for all similar joint tort ailments.
The contribution question is left open in a situation involving
more than two joint tortfeasors. What would be the result, for
example, if only one of the non-settling defendants is solvent,
and is required to satisfy the entire judgment less the solvent settling
tortfeasor's proportionate share? Perhaps he would be allowed to
obtain contribution against the settling tortfeasor but there is no
indication that the rationale of the Palestine decision would not be
extended to encompass a situation involving more than two joint
tortfeasors. While it is true that the solvency-insolvency argument
advanced by the dissent in Palestine may command greater attention
in a situation involving more than two joint tortfeasors, it is doubtful
that it would succeed in the face of the policy of encouraging com-
promise and settlement.
The trend in jurisdictions which have faced these problems is
toward denying contribution and reducing the plaintiff's damages.
The basis of most of these decisions is that the plaintiff is making
his settlement based on a rational analysis of his chances of recovery
against the particular tortfeasor involved. If such is actually the
case, then there can be no argument to the effect that the decisions
circumvent the intentions of the parties. If not, then the decisions
could serve to deprive a plaintiff of his full satisfaction against his
intentions. The difficulty with the trend is that it attempts to settle
a dispute between two divergent theories, neither of which is able to
provide a completely satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, the rule of
reduced damages at least has the virtue of simplicity and finality.
Jobn W. Bickle
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